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Control processes engaged in halting the automatic retrieval of unwanted memories have been shown to
reduce the later recallability of the targets of suppression. Like other cognitive skills that benefit from
practice, we hypothesized that memory control is similarly experience dependent, such that individuals
with greater real-life experience at stopping retrieval would exhibit better inhibitory control over
unwanted memories. Across two experiments, we found that college students reporting a greater history
of trauma exhibited more suppression-induced forgetting of both negative and neutral memories than did
those in a matched group who had reported experiencing little to no trauma. The association was
especially evident on a test of suppression-induced forgetting involving independent retrieval cues that
are designed to better isolate the effects of inhibitory control on memory. Participants reporting more
trauma demonstrated greater generalized forgetting of suppressed material. These findings raise the
possibility that, given proper training, individuals can learn to better manage intrusive experiences, and
are broadly consistent with the view that moderate adversity can foster resilience later in life.
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After traumatic experiences, survivors often experience intru-
sive memories that undermine their peace of mind. Innocuous
stimuli have the power to evoke unwelcome memories. The jump
of a child on a sidewalk may remind a veteran of a roadside attack
in Afghanistan, or a dog barking may trigger memories of the night
a person got news of a loved-one’s death. Intrusive memories,
however, decline over time for most people (Dougall, Craig, &
Baum, 1999). This observation raises a fundamental question
about the nature of this remission: Why do intrusions decline?
Does this remission reflect a passive forgetting that happens to all
memories? Or might people’s early efforts to cope with intrusions
help enhance mental functioning to handle new challenges? Put
simply, is it that “Time heals all wounds” or “What doesn’t kill
you, makes you stronger?”
In this article, we consider whether the remission of intrusive
memories after trauma might derive, in part, from the strengthened
ability to suppress retrieval through inhibitory control. Three gen-
eral observations support our hypothesis. First, after a trauma,
people often report suppressing unwelcome remindings so that
they can regain focus (Bomyea & Lang, 2016; Ehlers, Mayou, &
Bryant, 1998). If so, repeatedly engaging this control process may
have far-reaching consequences (e.g., Hulbert, Henson, & Ander-
son, 2016). It could constitute a natural and strongly motivated
case of cognitive training, facilitating the development of effective
habits of control (cf. Hertel, 2004). Recovering from intrusive
memories, therefore, could partially reflect improved memory
inhibition, possibly explaining why those suffering from enduring
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) exhibit worse memory con-
trol in laboratory studies (e.g., Catarino, Küpper, Werner-Seidler,
Dalgleish, & Anderson, 2015). Second, evidence for experience-
dependent cortical plasticity indicates that practicing cognitive
tasks can cause lasting structural changes (see, e.g., Draganski,
Kherif, & Lutti, 2014; May, 2011, for reviews). Of particular
relevance, Lyoo et al. (2011) found that survivors of a tragic arson
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event exhibited a selective increase of cortical thickness in lateral
prefrontal regions a year after the trauma. Cortical thickness of the
affected regions, which were broadly consistent with those en-
gaged in retrieval suppression (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014),
predicted recovery from PTSD symptoms, such as memory intru-
sions. Third, and critically, the notion that trauma, at least in
moderate amounts, may have enduring benefits receives strong
support from longitudinal studies that have linked cumulative
lifetime adversity to improved resilience: People exposed to some
adversity exhibit better mental health and resilience to adversity
later in life, relative to individuals exposed to either a high amount
of adversity or to no adversity (e.g., Seery, 2011; Seery, Holman,
& Silver, 2010). The counterintuitive observation that adversity
can be beneficial lends credence to the possibility that trauma
history fosters experience-dependent changes in cognitive skills
that could support resilience, although the nature of those skills
remains unclear.
Here we consider whether one skill that might benefit from
adversity is the ability to reduce intrusions from unwanted mem-
ories. Specifically, we report two experiments testing whether
people who have experienced more traumatic events are better at
inhibiting memories compared with individuals who were largely
spared from such experiences. We asked participants to perform a
version of the Think/No-Think (hereinafter, TNT) task (Anderson
& Green, 2001) that incorporated emotionally neutral and negative
items. The task requires participants to attend to reminders of
previously acquired associations involving those items. For each
reminder, they are cued either to retrieve the associated memory
(Think trials) or to instead suppress its retrieval (No-Think trials).
Repeatedly suppressing retrieval impairs retention of the associ-
ated memory, a phenomenon known as suppression-induced for-
getting (Anderson & Green, 2001; see Anderson & Hanslmayr,
2014, for a review). Retrieving memories, in contrast, enhances
later recall of the associates. Notably, comparable fronto-parietal
control regions are engaged during suppression of neutral and
negative content (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Butler & James,
2010; Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007; Gagnepain, Hulbert, &
Anderson, 2017; see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014, for a review),
and successful engagement of these regions to suppress retrieval
also reduces negative affect associated with unpleasant images
(Gagnepain et al., 2017).
In our adaptation of the TNT task, participants were first trained
on word pairs consisting of neutral cues (e.g., street) and either
neutral (violin) or unpleasant response words (corpse). Participants
then were instructed to retrieve or suppress the associated response
0 (Baseline), one or 16 times during the TNT phase. Following this
manipulation, we measured the accessibility of all of the response
words using two surprise cued-recall tests, the order of which was
counterbalanced across participants: the “same-probe” test and the
“independent-probe” test (Anderson & Green, 2001). Whereas the
same-probe test (hereinafter the SP test) measured accessibility by
using the same cues originally studied with the response, the
independent-probe test (hereinafter, the IP test) instead used ex-
tralist semantic cues (e.g., anatomy c___). This latter test provides
a purer assay of the aftereffects of inhibitory processes on the
suppressed response because it sidesteps the original cue-target
association (Anderson & Green, 2001). Indeed, the SP test likely
mixes the contributions of persisting memory inhibition with as-
sociative interference (Anderson & Huddleston, 2011; Anderson &
Levy, 2009; Noreen & de Fockert, 2017; Wang, Cao, Zhu, Cai, &
Wu, 2015), making it harder to isolate individual differences in
inhibitory processes using this test of suppression-induced forget-
ting (Anderson & Levy, 2007). Item-specific cuing tests, such as
our IP measure, are more sensitive to individual differences in
inhibition (e.g., Anderson, Reinholz, Kuhl, & Mayr, 2011; for
related findings, see Schilling, Storm, & Anderson, 2014).
Suppression-induced forgetting has regularly been observed using
IP tests for a variety of stimuli (see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014;
Anderson & Huddleston, 2011, for reviews), including emotional
materials (e.g., see Lambert, Good, & Kirk, 2010; Murray, Ander-
son, & Kensinger, 2015; Murray, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2011).
To determine whether self-reported trauma is related to individ-
ual differences in suppression-induced forgetting, we asked
college-aged participants to estimate the number of traumas they
experienced prior to the age of 18 using a survey that addressed a
wide range of trauma types (Goldberg & Freyd, 2006). We then
examined whether individuals reporting more traumatic experi-
ences demonstrated greater suppression-induced forgetting on the
final tests of the TNT paradigm for both negative and neutral target
items. Given the similarity in the brain systems engaged to sup-
press retrieval of negative and neutral content in prior work (An-
derson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007; Gagnepain et al., 2017), we
predicted that any advantage in suppression-induced forgetting
should arise regardless of the valence of suppressed content. In-
deed, to the extent that traumatic experience augments memory
control abilities generally, the advantage should extend beyond
negative materials. Nevertheless, it is possible that there may be an
additional adaptive benefit for materials that give rise to a negative
affective context more closely matching that which motivated
suppression practice outside of the laboratory. To rigorously com-
pare the relative magnitude of suppression-induced forgetting
across valences, we (a) carefully matched negative and neutral
response words on length, frequency, concreteness, and other
dimensions that are sometimes confounded with valence manipu-
lations (see Method) and (b) ensured that the same reminder cues
paired with neutral targets were also paired with negative targets
(across participants). Finally, given prior evidence that item-
specific, cue-independent measures of forgetting are more sensi-
tive to individual differences in inhibitory control (Anderson et al.,
2011; Schilling et al., 2014), we predicted that the influence of
prior trauma history on suppression-induced forgetting may be
especially evident on our IP test of cue-independent forgetting.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we defined the lower- and higher-trauma
groups based on a postexperimentally administered traumatic ex-
periences survey (Goldberg & Freyd, 2006). The survey asked
participants to estimate the frequency of a range of traumatic
incidents (e.g., witnessing or experiencing accidents, natural di-
sasters, violence, sexual assault/abuse, emotional abuse, and the
death of significant individuals) separately for the periods before
age 18 and afterward. We divided our sample into equal groups
reporting lower and higher levels of total trauma events prior to the
age of 18, while holding our stimulus and test order counterbal-
ancing factors constant. We sought to establish two groups that
were treated identically during the experiment, notwithstanding
their differing levels of self-reported trauma. If a greater history of
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trauma provides a natural opportunity to practice retrieval suppres-
sion, and if these experiences yield a generalized suppression skill,
we should find greater suppression-induced forgetting in our
higher-trauma group.
Method
Participants. Participants were undergraduates (N  48) re-
ceiving credit for a course requirement. The stopping point for data
collection was preselected based on previous research using a
similar design (Anderson & Green, 2001) and was constrained by
counterbalancing (there were 24 unique cells after combining our
stimulus and test order counterbalancing factors; see Materials).
An additional five participants were run but were excluded and
will not be considered further on the basis of their inability to reach
criterion for initial learning (n  2), failure to comply with
instructions (n  2), or history of brain damage (n  1). These
exclusion criteria were based on long-standing lab protocols (see,
e.g., Anderson et al., 2004, 2011) and supported by empirical
evidence (e.g., Hertel & Calcaterra, 2005). All participants pro-
vided written informed consent in accordance with the protocol
approved by the University of Oregon’s Institutional Review
Board.
Materials.
Stimuli. We predicted that more extensive experience inhib-
iting unwanted memories would lead to improved suppression
ability on material that was not necessarily related to the original
trauma (cf., Catarino et al., 2015). As such, a single set of 60
critical word pairs (e.g., street-violin; trunk-corpse) and six fillers
was constructed, each pair being composed of a neutral cue word
and either a neutral or negative response word. The full stimulus
set can be found in Table S3 in the online supplemental materials.
Cue words were counterbalanced across participants, such that
each neutral cue appeared equally often with neutral and negative
response words (e.g., one set of participants would receive the
above pairings, whereas another set would study trunk-violin and
street-corpse). The cues were selected to be moderately relatable
to their target responses but unrelated to any other words in the
stimulus set.
Negative response words were defined as having a valence
rating of less than 3.00, whereas the valence ratings for neutral
words fell between 4.02–5.98 according to the Affective Norms
for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). In addition to
the deliberate difference in valence (Mneutral  5.61, SDneutral 
.53; Mnegative  2.21, SDnegative  .51), negative responses were
also associated with significantly greater arousal and reduced
dominance, p  .001 in all cases. In the instances for which
norming data were unavailable, an independent sample of 10 raters
used comparable methodologies to determine the relevant values.
Response members of word pairs were carefully selected so that,
across item sets (negative vs. neutral items), they did not differ on
any of the following dimensions: word-length, syllables, word
frequency, concreteness, or associative set size (Nelson, McEvoy,
& Schreiber, 2004), p  .24 in all cases. Special care was taken to
avoid strong preexisting associations between any two responses.
Independent probes for all of the response words were con-
structed by selecting other words that were highly related to the
target response but unrelated to the original cues (e.g., lessons-vi__
for violin) according to norms (Nelson et al., 2004). Unlike in most
studies using independent probes (see Anderson & Hanslmayr,
2014, for a review), we provided a two-letter stem cue (vi__ in the
above example) instead of a single letter stem. This change in
lexical information was motivated by our use, in this study, of
associative independent probes (e.g., lessons- for violin) instead of
categorical ones (e.g., meat- for beef). The change in cue type was
necessitated by our manipulation of response valence: Because we
required 30 neutral and 30 negatively valenced response words, it
was challenging to identify enough distinct semantic categories to
serve as independent probes in each grouping. Because of this, we
cued with semantic associates instead of categories. Out of concern
that associations may be too weak as cues, we provided additional
cuing support by increasing the lexical information provided by
the stem.
Traumatic experiences survey. We administered the Brief
Betrayal-Trauma Survey (BBTS; Goldberg & Freyd, 2006) after
participants completed the TNT task. The 12-item survey asked
participants to estimate the frequency of traumatic incidents sep-
arately for the periods before age 18 and afterward. Because the
mean age of participants in Experiment 1 was only 20.35 years
(SD  2.21), we operationalized trauma history as the average
frequency score based on events that happened before age 18,
disregarding type of trauma. Specifically, these average scores
were derived from participants’ best estimate of the number of
instances of each type of trauma assessed using a 6-point scale for
each item on the survey [0  never; 1  one time; 2  two to five
times; 3 six to 20 times; 4 21 to 100 times; 5 more than 100
times]. See Table S1 in the online supplemental materials for
descriptive statistics and further demographic information.
Procedure. Participants initially viewed each of the word
pairs for 6 s. After this study phase, we drilled participants on the
pairs. We presented each cue and asked participants to vocally
respond with the associated response word within a 4-s time
window. We provided corrective feedback after each trial. We
gave participants up to three cycles to correctly recall at least 50%
of the items, a training threshold representative of many studies
(e.g., Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004; Benoit &
Anderson, 2012; van Schie & Anderson, 2017).
After reaching learning criterion, participants entered the TNT
phase, in which we instructed them to say the associated response
word to any cue word presented in green as fast as possible
(feedback would be presented if they failed to respond out loud).
In contrast to these Think trials, if a cue word appeared in red
(indicating a No-Think trial), they were to avoid both thinking
about and saying the response word for the same 4-s trial duration.
In all cases, participants were to direct their eyes and attention to
the cue word. Cue words appeared consistently in either green or
red 0 (Baseline), 1, or 16 times during the phase. The counterbal-
ancing of word pairs across these six conditions (0, 1, or 16
repetitions in either the Think or No-Think instruction conditions)
crossed with the two possible response pairings described earlier
(neutral and negative valence), produced 12 counterbalancing cells
to achieve full balancing of stimulus materials across conditions.
Two surprise recall tests were then administered for all of the
learned responses (Anderson & Green, 2001). The same probe
(SP) test presented participants with the original cue words, for
which they had up to 4 s to say the associated response aloud. The
independent probe (IP) test was structured similarly, except that
the probe consisted of a novel semantic cue and a word stem. The
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two tests were administered in a counterbalanced order across
participants. Combining this test order factor with the 12 stimulus-
counterbalancing levels discussed above yielded a total of 24
unique counterbalancing combinations. For both the SP and IP
tests, we encouraged participants to provide the correct answer as
quickly as possible for every probe, regardless of the instructions
during the TNT phase.
After the final memory tests, participants rated each word from
the stimulus set and a random selection of 30 positive words in
terms of valence using a method akin to the ANEW (Bradley &
Lang, 1999). A postexperimental questionnaire assessing compli-
ance was then administered prior to the Beck Depression Inventory
(see Table S1 for BDI scores; Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988).
Finally, we asked participants to complete Goldberg and Freyd’s
(2006) traumatic experiences survey, which was used to establish
their group status. Given that 24 participants were required to
obtain even counterbalancing, we ran 48 participants, to enable
construction of two groups, matched perfectly for counterbalanc-
ing, but differing in reported trauma.
Analysis approach. In analyzing the final test recall data, we
first examined suppression-induced forgetting and retrieval-
induced facilitation effects across test types (i.e., aggregated over
the SP and IP tests) to characterize the general influence of our
instruction manipulation on recall, irrespective of the nature of the
final test cue. We then followed these analyses with tests of possible
interactions by test type to determine whether the effects of interest
generalized over different retrieval cues used to assess performance. If
suppression-induced forgetting is cue-independent, for example, we
would expect it to emerge in response to both types of test cues. If a
significant interaction with test type was observed, we characterized
these effects separately for each test type to isolate the nature of the
interaction. If an overall effect was significant but no interaction
observed, we interpreted this to suggest that test type did not moderate
the overall effect, consistent with cue-independence.
We analyzed the relation between trauma experience and inhib-
itory control over memory via a group analysis (see later section
entitled “Integrated Analyses of Experiments 1 and 2” for a com-
plementary analysis using robust correlation). We divided our
sample into equal groups reporting lower and higher levels of
trauma, while holding our stimulus and test order counterbalancing
factors constant. Thus, lower- and higher-trauma groups were
established via a median split based on participants’ trauma scores,
separately within each of our 24 counterbalancing conditions. By
combining the lower-trauma halves of each of these splits together,
we formed a fully counterbalanced sample that had lower trauma
scores than did the corresponding higher-trauma group, which was
similarly composed by combining the higher-trauma halves of
these splits (for other examples of this approach, see, e.g., Ander-
son et al., 2004; Hanslmayr, Leipold, Pastötter, & Bäuml, 2009). In
cases for which participants had the same trauma frequency (of
which there were two), ties were broken based on the number of
traumas reported after the age of 18 or, in a single case, a coin
toss.1
One disadvantage of our group analysis approach is that it runs
the risk of reducing the difference in level of trauma across the
higher- and lower-trauma groups. By conducting the median split
within each counterbalancing group, for example, it is possible for
the “higher” trauma participants in one split to have lower levels of
trauma than “lower” trauma groups in a different split for another
counterbalancing group. Thus, by insisting on the constraint that
the groups be matched across all counterbalancing dimensions, the
trauma scores of the two groups may have some overlap. To
determine whether this issue compromised how strongly our
lower- and higher-trauma groups differed in their level of trauma,
we conducted a check on the quality of our split. To do this, we
compared the trauma levels in our carefully matched median split
to the trauma levels that would have been obtained had we simply
performed a median split on the entire sample of 48, disregarding
counterbalancing. This latter version of the split revealed a differ-
ence in average trauma scores across the groups that broadly
matched that of the groups formed using the original procedure
(compare Table S1 with Table S2), suggesting that our matching
procedure did little to compromise how strongly the higher- and
lower-trauma groups differed.
Results
Training phase performance. Participants took 1.88 (SD 
0.70) cycles on average to reach criterion (averaging 41 out of 66
items correct in their final cycle, SD  5.88), discounting five
participants (three lower-trauma and two higher-trauma partici-
pants) for whom the criterion data were not retained in error.
Neither the number of cycles to reach criterion, t(41)  0.63, p 
.535, nor the number of correct items in the last cycle,
t(41)  0.07, p  .946, differed significantly across higher- and
lower-trauma groups (two-tailed tests).
Final test phase performance. By crossing the instruction
factor (Think vs. No-Think) with repetition (0 vs. 16), our exper-
iment had two identical Baseline (0 repetitions) cells. Because
these cells should not meaningfully differ, we combined them for
ANOVAs that focused on the suppression-induced forgetting and
retrieval-induced facilitation effects. The ANOVA addressing the
overall memory control effect (Think vs. No-Think), however,
necessitated separation of these baselines (e.g., testing the inter-
action of repetition by instruction).2
Overall memory control effects. Participants showed robust
control over the retrieval process, as reflected by the interaction of
instruction with repetition on final test recall, F(1, 24)  20.86,
p  .001, p2  .465. Both lower-trauma participants, F(1, 24) 
3.17, p  .088, p2  .117, and higher-trauma participants, F(1,
24)  21.90, p  .001, p2  .477, showed evidence for control
effects, as can be seen in Figure 1. This recall benefit for Think
1 The coin toss broke a tie between two participants who reported no
trauma. This led, by our group-formation protocol, to one participant with
no reported trauma being assigned to the higher-trauma group for the sake
of matching counterbalancing and sample size. Excluding these two tied
subjects leaves the pattern of suppression-induced forgetting across trauma
groups highly similar to what will be reported below. We thus retained the
participants to adhere to our specified protocol and include all possible
participants.
2 Here we focus our coverage of the results on those main effects and
interactions motivated by our a priori hypotheses introduced above. The
complexity of our overall design, owing to counterbalancing and up to
five other factors, makes it impractical to report the results of all possible
statistical tests allowed by the design. Cases in which valence or test type
significantly qualified our conclusions about suppression-induced forget-
ting are reported in the main text. It can be assumed that all reported
significant repetition effects (or interactions of this factor with trauma or
test type) related to suppression-induced forgetting are not moderated by
stimulus counterbalancing.
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items relative to No-Think items indicates that participants could,
at a minimum, stop the retrieval process from occurring on No-
Think trials often enough to preempt the strengthening/facilitation
that retrieved Think items usually exhibit. It does not, however,
address the separate effects of retrieval-induced facilitation (spe-
cifically, Think recall relative to Baseline) or suppression-induced
forgetting (specifically, No-Think recall relative to Baseline),
which we discuss next.
Retrieval-induced facilitation. Consistent with prior work,
we found that final recall performance for Think items was reliably
better after 16 retrieval attempts than after none (Baseline),
F(1, 24)  61.79, p  .001, p2  .720. This effect did not interact
Figure 1. Final test results by trauma group in Experiment 1. The top panels present aggregate final recall
(averaged across same-probe [SP] and independent-probe [IP] measures) scores relative to Baseline performance
for Think and No-Think items as a function of repetition. Being repeatedly exposed to reminders facilitated
Think items in a way not observed for No-Think items in either trauma group. Yet, only the higher-trauma group
(top right panel) exhibited significant below-Baseline forgetting of No-Think items as a result of retrieval
suppression. The bottom panel depicts suppression-induced forgetting (16 No-Think repetitions – 0 repetition
Baseline) separately on SP and IP tests of forgetting. Negative values represent suppression-induced forgetting
as a result of previous suppression attempts, whereas positive values represent suppression-induced facilitation.
Error bars reflect SEs.
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with valence, F  1. Importantly, the facilitation did not differ
reliably across trauma groups, F  1, despite a small numerical
tendency for higher-trauma participants to show less facilitation.
Thus, attending to Think items produced retention benefits that
were statistically similar for the two trauma groups. This similarity
of facilitation across higher- and lower-trauma groups was true
irrespective of target item valence, as reflected in a nonsignificant
trauma History  Repetition  Valence (neutral vs. negative)
interaction, F  1.
Facilitation was, however, greater when Think items were tested
on the SP compared with the IP test, F(1, 24)  85.10, p  .001,
p2  .780. In particular, whereas the SP test showed robust
facilitation of Think items, F(1, 24)  151.45, p  .001, p2 
.863, the IP test showed no evidence of facilitation, F  1. This
attenuated facilitation on the IP test is consistently observed in the
Think/No-Think paradigm (see Anderson & Huddleston, 2011, for
a meta-analysis of 1300 participants tested with IPs) and indicates
that the benefits of repeated retrieval on later retention are primar-
ily associative and cue-specific.
Suppression-induced forgetting. Next, we examined whether
suppressing the retrieval process impaired final test performance
for No-Think items relative to Baseline performance. To estimate
suppression, we compared recall of No-Think response words after
0 suppression attempts (Baseline) to performance after 16 suppres-
sion attempts. We first tested for suppression-induced forgetting,
collapsed over type of test and valence, to assess the effect of
suppression on overall retention. The group, as a whole, showed
better recall in the Baseline condition than after retrieval suppres-
sion, although this effect was marginally significant, F(1, 24) 
4.06, p  .055, p2  .145. Thus, independent of trauma history,
suppressing retrieval tended to impair overall retention of sup-
pressed items in a manner largely consistent with prior work. The
counterbalanced order in which the two constituent tests were
administered did not affect this conclusion, as reflected in a non-
significant interaction of test Order  Repetition, F(1, 48)  1.47,
p  .232, p2  .030. Importantly, the repetition effect did not
interact with the emotional valence of the suppression target, F 
1, indicating that the effect was comparable for both neutral and
negative items.
Of key interest, however, was whether participants who reported
having lived through more traumatic experiences differed in how
well they contended with unwanted memories. Strikingly, we
found that, whereas participants with greater experience with
trauma displayed significant forgetting of No-Think items (Base-
line minus No-Think recall  80%  72%, yielding an 8%
suppression-induced forgetting effect), F(1, 24)  9.62, p  .005,
p2  .286, the lower-trauma group displayed no reliable evidence
of this ability to forget, (Baseline minus No-Think recall 77%
77%, yielding a 0% effect), F  1. This difference in suppression-
induced forgetting was significant, as reflected by an interaction of
repetition and trauma, F(1, 24)  5.62, p  .026, p2  .190.
Importantly, this apparent trauma-history advantage did not inter-
act reliably with the emotional valence of the target material being
suppressed, F  1, suggesting that it reflects a generalized skill of
suppression, regardless of valence. Thus, more extensive trauma
exposure was associated with an enhanced ability to suppress
unwanted memories.
Variation in suppression-induced forgetting by test type.
To determine whether suppression impaired access to unwanted
memories in a cue-independent manner (Anderson & Green,
2001), we tested whether suppression-induced forgetting varied
across our SP and IP tests. Contrary to our expectation, we ob-
served a significant interaction of Repetition  Test type, F(1,
24)  11.28, p  .003, p2  .320, with significant suppression-
induced forgetting on the SP test, F(1, 24) 11.53, p .002, p2
.325, but no reliable forgetting on the IP test, F 1. This variation
in suppression-induced forgetting across test type did not interact
with the valence of target items, F  1.
Despite the lack of an overall effect of suppression-induced
forgetting on the IP test, this finding does not address the origins of
trauma-history advantage. To the extent that greater suppression-
induced forgetting for higher-trauma participants reflects an en-
hanced ability to inhibit memories, the suppression advantage
should generalize to IPs. To test this, we examined the interaction
of Repetition  Trauma  Test type. Consistent with this gener-
alization, the trauma-history advantage in suppression-induced
forgetting did not interact with test type, F(1, 24)  1.18, p 
.289, p2  .047. As can be seen in Figure 1, participants with
lower trauma showed reliable suppression-induced facilitation on
the IP test, F(1, 24)  4.88, p  .037, p2  .169, whereas
higher-trauma participants show a weak trend toward suppression-
induced forgetting, F(1, 24)  2.76, p  .109, p2  .103. The
foregoing findings suggest that the suppression-induced forgetting
advantage for those reporting higher levels of trauma might arise,
in part, from greater engagement of inhibition to stop retrieval.
Discussion
Experiment 1 indicates that people who report having greater
experience with traumatic events may, indeed, be better at sup-
pressing the retrieval of unwanted memories, even in our simple
laboratory task. As predicted, participants in our higher-trauma
group exhibited greater suppression-induced forgetting than did
participants in our lower-trauma group. Interestingly, although the
latter group could likely prevent retrieval from happening (as
suggested by the lack of an overall positive benefit of being
repeatedly exposed to reminders for No-Think items), they showed
no evidence of an ability to forget the items that they had tried to
suppress. The superior forgetting exhibited by our higher-trauma
group did not vary across negative or neutrally valenced materials,
consistent with the possibility that the mechanism underlying the
retrieval-suppression advantage is not tied to aversive experiences,
per se, but rather to controlling mnemonic content in general. The
trauma-history advantage also did not vary with test type, with
similar benefits on the SP and IP tests, consistent with the possible
contribution of improved inhibitory control over memory. Indeed,
lower-trauma participants showed a reversal of suppression on the
IP test, indicating that their forgetting is cue-dependent.
In Experiment 1, overall suppression-induced forgetting did not
generalize to the IP test. This contrasts with other, similarly
conducted experiments showing comparable effects on SP and IP
tests (see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014, for a review; see also
Wang et al., 2015). One possibility is that reduced IP forgetting
may be linked to the additional lexical information provided to
subjects: Unlike in most other TNT studies, which most commonly
use IP cues with a single letter stem (e.g., Anderson & Green,
2001; Anderson et al., 2004) or no stem (Wang et al., 2015), we
provided two letters. Moreover, the IPs were associative (e.g.,
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anatomy-co__ for corpse and bag-ga__ for garbage) rather than
categorical (e.g., meat-be__ for beef). Associative cues might have
been more difficult, prompting greater reliance on a lexical search
strategy in response to the expanded letter stem. Evidence suggests
that indirect word fragment completion tasks are less sensitive to
suppression-induced forgetting (Angello, Storm, & Smith, 2015).
If so, then our IP measure of inhibition may have been diluted by
nonepisodic lexical retrieval.
Experiment 1 did not clearly support our prediction that IP tests
would be more sensitive to the hypothesized differences in inhib-
itory control. Specifically, we predicted that the difference be-
tween lower- and higher-trauma groups in suppression-induced
forgetting would be larger on the IP test. Although there was a
trend in that direction (higher-trauma participants displayed an
11% average suppression-induced forgetting effect on the SP test,
compared with a 5% effect displayed by lower-trauma partici-
pants—resulting in a 6 percentage-point forgetting advantage for
higher-trauma participants; on the IP test, by contrast, higher-
trauma participants displayed a 5% average suppression-induced
forgetting effect, compared with a6% effect displayed by lower-
trauma participants—resulting in an 11 percentage-point forgetting
advantage for higher-trauma participants; see Table 1), this inter-
action was not significant. The predicted sensitivity of the IP test
may yet emerge if the contributions of lexical retrieval are con-
trolled.
Although the foregoing results broadly support a trauma-history
advantage in suppression-induced forgetting, it is important to
consider whether, our findings truly reflect a greater capacity to
forget, or instead the contributions of experimenter/participant
biases. Although unlikely, by administering the traumatic experi-
ences survey at the end of the experiment, the experimenters could,
in principle, have been unintentionally influenced in their scoring
of the data (e.g., to the extent that any responses were ambiguous)
by their knowledge of a participant’s trauma status. Alternatively,
when participants attempted to suppress the retrieval of unwanted
memories during our task, they may have formed opinions about
the purpose of the experiment that led them to alter their responses
to the traumatic experiences survey in some fashion. Some par-
ticipants also might have been tempted to withhold correctly
recalled responses based on these demands. Although largely
excluded as an account of suppression-induced forgetting in
several experiments previously (Anderson & Green, 2001), it is
important to consider whether, in the current study, such biases
could play a role. We address these possibilities, along with the
foregoing issues about cue-independent forgetting, in Experi-
ment 2.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 sought to replicate the findings of Experiment 1
but with even more rigorous procedural controls. These controls
were designed to ensure that (a) neither experimenter nor partici-
pant bias contaminated any evidence for trauma-related improve-
ments in memory control, and (b) participants were suitably mo-
tivated on the final test to recall the items they had suppressed.
Toward these ends, instead of administering the traumatic experi-
ences survey postexperimentally, we administered it in a multi-
laboratory battery weeks (or longer) before the experiment, in an
independent prescreening session online. This procedure ensured a
clean separation of higher- and lower-trauma groups by their
reported level of traumatic experience. Moreover, it disguised any
relationship between our experiment and participants’ trauma his-
tory, so that participants’ responses on the survey would neither (a)
be influenced by taking part in the TNT task, nor (b) be known to
experimenters administering the procedure or scoring the data. To
ensure the latter point, we also used a blinding procedure whereby
the laboratory coordinator assigned experimenters to participants
in a manner that did not identify participants’ trauma status.
Moreover, during the final tests, we tried to ensure that participants
always reported a recalled response, if they could. We modified
the test instructions to strongly emphasize the need to provide
answers to all items, if possible, even if participants were unsure of
their answers. We also offered monetary incentives for each crit-




No-Think repetitions Think repetitions
0 1 16 0 1 16
Experiment 1
SP test
Lower trauma 79% [74, 84] 76% [70, 82] 74% [67, 82] 79% [74, 84] 82% [77, 88] 96% [94, 98]
Higher trauma 81% [76, 85] 76% [70, 82] 70% [63, 78] 81% [76, 85] 90% [84, 96] 98% [96, 100]
IP test
Lower trauma 74% [69, 80] 72% [66, 78] 80% [74, 87] 74% [69, 80] 80% [75, 85] 75% [69, 80]
Higher trauma 78% [72, 83] 74% [68, 80] 73% [66, 80] 78% [72, 83] 81% [76, 87] 75% [69, 80]
Experiment 2
SP test
Lower trauma 78% [73, 83] 78% [71, 84] 73% [66, 81] 78% [73, 83] 87% [81, 92] 96% [94, 98]
Higher trauma 82% [77, 87] 76% [70, 82] 73% [65, 80] 82% [77, 87] 92% [86, 97] 97% [95, 91]
IP test
Lower trauma 51% [46, 57] 54% [48, 61] 51% [44, 57] 51% [46, 57] 61% [56, 67] 60% [54, 66]
Higher trauma 59% [54, 65] 57% [51, 63] 50% [43, 56] 59% [54, 65] 63% [58, 68] 62% [57, 68]
Note. Final recall results on the two final test measures (same probe [SP] and independent probe [IP]) as a function of repetitions of No-Think (left) and
Think (right) reminders, broken out by trauma history. Values in brackets reflect the 95% confidence interval for the marginal means. Note that the Baseline
data (from the 0-repetition condition) are shared across Think and No-Think data.
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to motivate participants to report every answer. Finally, Experi-
ment 2 also modified the IP test by reducing the number of letters
in the stem cue from two to one to increase sensitivity of the test
to inhibition. As in Experiment 1, we predicted that the pattern of
greater forgetting for higher trauma participants should generalize
over cues, and so, not vary as a function of the type of test.
Method
Participants. We selected participants in the higher- or the
lower-trauma groups on the basis of their scores on Goldberg
and Freyd’s (2006) traumatic experiences survey, as in Exper-
iment 1. However, this survey was administered with other
measures across online prescreening sessions for introductory
psychology classes (N  512 over two semesters) as part of a
multilab effort. From this, potentially eligible recruits were
invited to participate in what was ostensibly an independent
study, without foreknowledge that their self-reported trauma
scores for events occurring prior to the age of 18 defined their
assignment to either the lower- or higher-trauma groups within
each one of our counterbalancing conditions.
Forty-eight undergraduates participated in exchange for course
credit (and a potential monetary bonus), run by an experimenter
who was blind as to their trauma history (see below). We ran an
additional nine participants to replace subjects who were excluded
because of an inability to reach the initial learning criterion (n 
7), failure to comply with instructions (n  1), or prior exposure
to the TNT paradigm (n  1). All participants provided written
informed consent in accordance with the protocol approved by the
University of Oregon’s Institutional Review Board.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were
identical to those in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions.
Final test. We reduced the length of the word stem used for
IPs to be a single letter instead of two letters as was used in
Experiment 1, to increase sensitivity to inhibition. In addition, the
final test instructions for Experiment 2 put additional emphasis on
the importance of recalling as many of the responses as possible,
even if participants were unsure of their answers. To emphasize
this point further and to facilitate motivation, we offered a mon-
etary reward of 20 cents for any correct response (provided on at
least one of the two test types) for a predetermined subset of final
test items (cf. Anderson & Green, 2001). Participants were in-
formed that they could earn up to $4.00 for providing correct
responses on unspecified “critical items,” which happened to con-
sist of the five No-Think responses each from their 1-repetition
neutral, 1-repetition negative, 16-repetition neutral, and 16-
repetition negative counterbalanced sets.
Blinding procedures. To ensure that experimenters were not
biased in the manner in which they administered the TNT task to
participants in the higher- or lower-trauma groups, we adopted a
blinding procedure in which experimenters had no knowledge of
the group that participants were in. A laboratory coordinator ran-
domly assigned participants to experimenters and did not label
participant materials in a way that indicated group status. Finally,
to ensure that data coding was unbiased, experimenters remained
blinded to participants’ group status while scoring recall perfor-
mance.
Results
Training phase performance. Participants took 1.75 (SD 
0.70) cycles on average to reach criterion (averaging 41 of 66
items correct in their final cycle, SD  6.04). Neither the number
of cycles to reach criterion, t(46) 1.25, p .219, nor the number
of correct items in the last cycle t(46)  0.55, p  .588, differed
significantly across higher- and lower-trauma groups (two-tailed
tests).
Final test phase performance.
Overall memory control effects. Participants showed robust
control over the retrieval process, as reflected by the interaction of
instruction with repetition, F(1, 24)  30.30, p  .001, p2  .588.
This overall memory control effect did not vary by trauma group,
F  1. Both lower-trauma participants, and higher-trauma partic-
ipants, showed evidence for control effects, as can be seen in
Figure 2 and Table 1. This indicates that, as in Experiment 1,
participants could, at a minimum, stop the retrieval process from
occurring on No-Think trials often enough to preempt the strength-
ening/facilitation that retrieved items usually exhibit. We next turn
to the separate effects of retrieval-induced facilitation and
suppression-induced forgetting.
Retrieval-induced facilitation. The facilitation effects in Ex-
periment 2 replicated those observed in Experiment 1 in nearly
every respect. Final recall performance for Think items was reli-
ably greater after 16 retrieval attempts than after none (Baseline),
F(1, 24)  48.98, p  .001, p2  .671. This effect that did not
interact with valence, F  1. Importantly, as in Experiment 1, the
facilitation did not differ across the trauma groups, F(1, 24) 
1.83, p  .188, p2  .071. Thus, retrieving Think items produced
retention benefits that were statistically similar for the two trauma
groups. This similarity of facilitation across groups was true irre-
spective of target item valence, as reflected by a nonsignificant
Repetition Trauma Valence interaction, F(1, 24) 1.97, p
.173, p2  .076.
As in Experiment 1, facilitation was greater when we tested
Think items on the SP compared with the IP test, F(1, 24) 11.57,
p  .002, p2  .325. In particular, whereas the SP test showed
robust facilitation of Think items, F(1, 24)  98.61, p  .001,
p2  .804, the IP test showed reliable, but quantitatively less
facilitation, F(1, 24)  5.06, p  .034, p2  .174. The latter
finding deviates from Experiment 1, which found no evidence of
facilitation on the IP test, perhaps indicating that reducing letter
stem cues in Experiment 2 improved sensitivity to facilitation.
Nevertheless, the facilitation was less pronounced on the IP test,
which is consistently observed in the Think/No-Think task (An-
derson & Huddleston, 2011).
Suppression-induced forgetting. As with facilitation, the
overall suppression-induced forgetting findings from Experiment 2
replicated Experiment 1. Collapsing over trauma group, test type,
and valence, the sample as a whole showed robust suppression-
induced forgetting, with better recall in the Baseline condition (0
repetitions) than after 16 retrieval suppression repetitions, F(1,
24)  8.52, p  .008, p2  .262. Thus, independent of trauma
history, suppressing retrieval impaired overall retention of No-
Think items in a manner consistent with Experiment 1 and prior
work. The counterbalanced order in which we administered the
two constituent tests did not affect this conclusion, as reflected by
a nonsignificant interaction of test order and repetition, F(1, 24) 
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1.06, p  .308, p2  .024. Importantly, the suppression-induced
forgetting effect showed no interaction with the valence of the
suppression target, F  1, demonstrating that the effect was
comparable for both neutral and negative items.
Of key interest, however, was whether higher-trauma partici-
pants would show superior suppression-induced forgetting, as they
had in Experiment 1, despite the array of procedural controls
introduced in Experiment 2. Critically, whereas participants with
higher trauma displayed robust forgetting of No-Think items
(Baseline minus No-Think recall  71%  62%, a 9% effect),
F(1, 24) 10.22, p .004, p2  .299, the lower-trauma group, in
contrast, displayed no reliable evidence of an ability to forget
No-Think items, (Baseline minus No-Think recall  64.5% 
62%  a 2.5% effect), F(1, 24)  0.87, p  .361, p2  .035. The
interaction of trauma Group  Repetition, however, did not quite
reach significance in this sample, F(1, 24)  2.57, p  .122, p2 
Figure 2. Final test results by trauma group in Experiment 2. The top panels present aggregate final recall
(averaged across same-probe [SP] and independent-probe [IP] measures) scores relative to Baseline performance
for Think and No-Think items as a function of repetition. Being repeatedly exposed to reminders facilitated
Think items in a way not observed for No-Think items in either trauma group. Only the higher-trauma group (top
right panel) exhibited significant below-Baseline forgetting of No-Think items as a result of retrieval suppres-
sion. The bottom panel depicts suppression-induced forgetting (16 No-Think repetitions – 0 repetition Baseline)
separately on SP and IP tests of forgetting. Negative values represent suppression-induced forgetting as a result
of previous suppression attempts. Error bars reflect SEs.
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.097. Nevertheless, the pattern of suppression observed across the
higher- and lower-trauma groups is both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively similar to that observed in Experiment 1 (see section
entitled “Integrated Analyses of Experiments 1 and 2” for a formal
statistical comparison of these patterns). Importantly, this apparent
trauma-history advantage did not interact reliably with the emo-
tional valence of the target material being suppressed, F(1, 24) 
1.64, p  .213, p2  .064, suggesting that this effect reflects a
generalized skill at suppression, regardless of valence.
Variation in suppression-induced forgetting by test type.
Unlike in Experiment 1, suppression-induced forgetting did not
vary reliably across our SP and IP tests, F  1, with similar
forgetting on the SP test (Baseline minus No-Think  80% 
73%  7%), and on the IP test (Baseline minus No-Think 
55%  50%  5%). Thus, suppression-induced forgetting gener-
alized over cues, a pattern that did not interact with the valence of
target items, F  1. These findings suggest that participants in
Experiment 1 may have been relying on a lexically focused re-
trieval strategy, a possibility consistent with the fact that overall IP
recall performance fell precipitously from 76% in Experiment 1 to
57% in Experiment 2 (a 19% reduction), a drop that was highly
significant, F(1, 48)  98.44, p  .001, p2  .672.
Next, we examined whether the greater suppression-induced
forgetting for higher-trauma participants reflected an enhanced
ability to inhibit unwanted memories. If so, we would expect the
trauma-history advantage to generalize to IPs, as it did in Exper-
iment 1. To test this, we examined the interaction of Repetition 
Trauma  Test type. Consistent with this possibility, the trauma-
history advantage in suppression-induced forgetting showed no
evidence of interacting with test type, F  1. This reflects the fact
that participants with lower reported trauma showed weaker
suppression-induced forgetting than higher-trauma participants
(Baseline minus No-Think recall) on both the SP test (lower
trauma: 78%  73%  5%; higher trauma: 82%  73%  9%)
and the IP test (lower trauma: 51%  51%  0%; higher trauma:
59%  50%  9%; see Figure 2). As in Experiment 1, the
difference in SIF across higher- and lower-trauma groups was
numerically smaller on the SP test (9%  5%  4%) than on the
IP test (9%  0%  9%), consistent with the possibility that the
IP test is more sensitive to differences in inhibitory function.
However, as detailed above, this interaction was not reliable.
Overall, these findings suggest that the suppression-induced for-
getting advantage for higher-trauma participants arises, in part,
from better engagement of inhibition.
Discussion
Experiment 2 suggests that the trauma-history advantage in
suppression-induced forgetting does not arise from participant or
experimenter bias or from participants not being motivated to
recall or report suppressed items. In Experiment 1, bias could have
influenced the data in several ways: awareness of participants’
trauma status (as reported on the postexperimental questionnaire)
could have influenced how experimenters scored the data; or
participants might have altered their trauma history reporting after
having participated in a task involving suppression; or participants
might have guessed the purpose of the study (to find evidence for
forgetting) and then deliberately withheld correctly recalled No-
Think items on the test. By collecting trauma-history data in a
separate and seemingly unrelated session weeks earlier, by adopt-
ing rigorous blinding procedures, and by strongly encouraging
participants to report all recalled responses (and adding monetary
incentives), Experiment 2 bolsters confidence that the trauma-
history advantage reflects a genuine difference in forgetting of the
memories people tried not to think about. This advantage did not
vary as a function of the valence of the suppressed items, suggest-
ing that it reflects a generalized enhancement of the suppression
process. Experiment 2 also replicated the finding that the trauma-
history advantage in suppression-induced forgetting did not vary
by test type, demonstrating that the superior forgetting generalized
across cues. This finding is consistent with the possibility that the
advantage reflects better inhibitory control in the higher-trauma
group.
Integrated Analyses of Experiments 1 and 2
To explore the relation of trauma history and suppression-
induced forgetting with greater statistical power, we combined the
data from our two similar experiments. In this section, we report
this analysis, which includes the same factors as in the experiment-
specific analyses, but with an additional between-subjects exper-
iment factor. This analysis enables us to establish, in a large
sample, the overall robustness of patterns observed in individual
experiments and to assess the reliability of any apparent differ-
ences across studies. We also report a complementary set of robust
and partial correlation analyses based on the combined sample to
examine whether a continuous relationship exists between the
frequency of trauma and suppression-induced forgetting, as well as
to assess the contributions of potential confounding variables, such
as depression or Baseline performance.
Results
Overall memory control effects. Participants showed ex-
tremely robust control over the retrieval process, as reflected by
the interaction of instruction (Think vs. No-Think) with repetition
(0 vs. 16), F(1, 48)  55.10, p  .001, p2  .534. This overall
memory control effect was a general feature of both studies and
did not interact with experiment, F(1, 48)  2.39, p  .129, p2 
.047. Importantly, both lower-trauma F(1, 48)  21.78, p  .001,
p2  .312, and higher-trauma participants, F(1, 48)  33.99, p 
.001, p2  .415, showed robust control effects.
Retrieval-induced facilitation. Overall, the facilitated recall
arising from repeated retrieval of Think items was statistically
comparable across Experiments 1 and 2. The tendency for 16
retrieval attempts to facilitate memories compared with Baseline
(0 attempts) was extremely robust, F(1, 48)  102.62, p  .001,
p2  .681, and did not vary by experiment, F(1, 48)  2.77, p 
.103, p2  .055, or with valence of the target, F  1. Facilitation
was, however, greater on the SP compared with the IP test, F(1,
48) 62.36, p .001, p2 .565, a pattern which did interact with
experiment, F(1, 48)  4.86, p  .032, p2  .092.
Importantly, even in this much larger, integrated sample, facil-
itation of Think items did not differ reliably across the trauma
groups, F(1, 48)  2.21, p  .143, p2  .044, with both lower-,
F(1, 48)  67.49, p  .001, p2  .584, and higher-trauma, F(1,
48) 37.34, p .001, p2 .438, participants experiencing robust
facilitation. The comparable facilitation across groups did not
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interact with experiment, as reflected by a nonsignificant Repeti-
tion  Trauma  Experiment interaction, F  1. These findings
indicate that our lower- and higher-trauma groups both benefited
from the repeated retrieval of memories and that this was consis-
tent across studies.
Suppression-induced forgetting. The overall suppression-
induced forgetting effect was highly robust and comparable across
experiments. No-Think items were generally recalled more poorly
than were Baseline items, F(1, 48)  12.51, p  .001, p2  .207,
and this effect did not interact reliably with experiment, F(1, 48)
1.02, p  .317, p2  .021. Critically, as suggested by the individ-
ual studies, the apparently greater suppression-induced forgetting
for higher-trauma participants was supported by a significant in-
teraction between repetition and trauma history, F(1, 48)  7.48,
p  .009, p2  .135. Whereas participants with greater experience
with trauma displayed significant forgetting of No-Think items
across the final tests, F(1, 48)  19.67, p  .001, p2  .291, the
lower-trauma group displayed no reliable evidence of an ability to
forget No-Think items, even in this much larger, integrated sam-
ple. The trauma-history advantage did not show any evidence of
interacting with valence (see Figure 3), F(1, 48)  1.21, p  .278,
p2  .025, or with experiment, F  1. Thus, despite the marginal
interaction of trauma and repetition in Experiment 2, the relative
difference in suppression-induced forgetting across higher- and
lower-trauma groups was statistically indistinguishable across ex-
periments. Indeed, the significant forgetting in the higher-trauma
group did not interact with experiment, F  1, nor did the lack of
suppression-induced forgetting in the lower-trauma group, F  1.
Thus, despite highly similar overall memory performance and
comparable facilitation of Think items, a prior history of more
trauma was associated selectively with the enhanced ability to
suppress unwanted memories.
Comparison of the trauma-history advantage over test type.
Although we had hypothesized that the IP test would be more
sensitive to differences in inhibitory control and although both
studies showed a numerical tendency supporting this, the trauma-
history advantage in suppression-induced forgetting still did not
vary reliably across our SP and IP tests, F(1, 48) 1.33, p .255,
p2  .027, despite the increase in sample size. This pattern did not
interact with experiment, as reflected in a nonsignificant interac-
tion of Repetition  Trauma  Test type  experiment, F  1.
Nevertheless, the lack of an interaction of test type with repetition
suggests that the superior forgetting exhibited by participants with
more traumatic experience occurs irrespective of test type, and so
may have a grounding in improved inhibitory control. Indeed,
higher-trauma participants exhibited significant forgetting, regard-
less of whether No-Think items were analyzed with respect to the
SP, F(1, 48)  18.22, p  .001, p2  .275, or the IP test, F(1,
48)  7.29, p  .010, p2  .132, consistent with this possibility.
Interestingly, lower-trauma participants exhibited qualitatively
different patterns of forgetting on the SP and IP tests. Whereas
overall forgetting (collapsed over test type) was not reliable,
lower-trauma participants exhibited reliable cue-specific forgetting
on the SP test. This cue-specific forgetting pattern in the lower-
trauma group was substantiated by a significant interaction of
repetition by test type, F(1, 48)  6.04, p  .018, p2  .112. In
contrast to the reliable forgetting seen for this group on the SP test,
F(1, 48) 4.70, p .035, p2 .089, no impairment was observed
on the IP test, F(1, 48)  1.11, p  .297, p2  .023. This pattern
did not interact with experiment, F(1, 48)  1.07, p  .306, p2 
.022. Thus, participants who reported relatively little experience
with trauma showed modest forgetting that also appeared to be
largely cue-dependent. This suggests that the observed forgetting
may not have reflected inhibition (Anderson & Levy, 2009; An-
derson et al., 2011; Noreen & de Fockert, 2017; Wang et al.,
2015). Taken together, the findings from this integrated analysis
suggest that experience with traumatic events may lead to more
effective use of inhibitory processes to control unwanted memo-
ries, and, as a consequence, to more generalized forgetting of those
memories in different cuing situations.
Correlational analyses of the integrated sample. We based
the foregoing conclusions about trauma history and forgetting on a
Figure 3. Final No-Think recall results as a function of valence and trauma group. Looking across experiments
and test types, similar suppression-induced forgetting in the higher-trauma group was observed across neutral
and negative materials. In contrast, the lower-trauma group did not show reliable forgetting in either case. Error
bars reflect SEs.
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group analysis approach. To complement this analysis, we also
leveraged the additional statistical power afforded with supple-
mentary correlation analyses by treating trauma history as a con-
tinuous measure (DeCoster, Iselin, & Gallucci, 2009). These anal-
yses sought to address several issues. First, although our group
analyses matched lower- and higher-trauma groups perfectly with
regard to our stimulus and test order counterbalancing manipula-
tions, they dichotomized our sample according to the level of
reported trauma, discarding information about gradations in
trauma that could be helpful in evaluating the generality of the
relationship between traumatic experience and inhibition. Second,
our group analyses provided numerically suggestive evidence that
the IP test is more sensitive to individual differences in inhibitory
control capacity that may be related to trauma history. These
tendencies were nonetheless not significant. It is possible that the
predicted superiority of the IP test in detecting differences in
inhibition may surface if our analysis considered more continuous
variation in trauma level. Finally, we sought to address potential
influences of self-reported depression and Baseline recall level as
factors contributing to the putative trauma-history advantage.
To address these objectives, we ran robust correlation tests for
our IP and SP measures of suppression-induced forgetting, treating
the average trauma score as a continuous measure across our 96
participants. After z-transforming the suppression-induced forget-
ting and trauma scores within each of the stimulus counterbalanc-
ing conditions, we used the Robust Correlation Toolbox for Mat-
lab, which down-weights/removes analytically identified bivariate
outliers, while statistically correcting for their removal (Pernet,
Wilcox, & Rousselet, 2013). Reliability of the Spearman outlier-
skipped correlation was determined based on the percentile boot-
strap confidence interval (i.e., if the 95% interval includes 0, the
null hypothesis of independence was not rejected), a method that
is more robust against heteroscedasticity than the traditional t test
(Pernet et al., 2013). We then subjected the data—stripped of
analytically identified bivariate outliers—to an additional partial
correlation analysis that examined the relationship between trau-
matic experience and suppression-induced forgetting while con-
trolling simultaneously for both self-reported depression severity
and Baseline recall performance.
In this correlational analysis, we confirmed that increasing lev-
els of reported trauma are associated with more generalized
suppression-induced forgetting, as evident by greater forgetting on
the IP test. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 4, the clearest
association with trauma history was evident on the IP test (skipped
Spearman rs 0.25, bootstrap-based 95% confidence interval [CI]
accounting for automatically removed bivariate outliers: [0.03,
0.45]). In contrast, the relationship between trauma history and
forgetting on the SP test was not reliable (skipped Spearman rs 
0.02, 95% CI [0.17, 0.23]). Across the nonoutlier data points, the
IP and SP correlation coefficients significantly differed according
to a one-tailed Meng’s z test for correlated correlation coefficients,
Meng’s z  1.67, p  .048 (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992).
This disparity across test types is consistent with prior work
indicating that item-specific cuing tests such as the IP test are more
sensitive to individual differences in inhibitory control (Anderson
& Levy, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Schilling et al., 2014; Wang
et al., 2015).
Next, we addressed potential influences of self-reported depres-
sion and Baseline recall via our supplementary correlational ap-
proach. First, it should be noted that in the group analysis, we
found that our trauma groups differed in neither BDI scores, F 
1, nor Baseline recall, F(1, 48)  3.63, p  .063, p2  .070,
Figure 4. Self-reported trauma from the first 18 years of participants’ lives reliably predicted suppression-
induced forgetting on the independent-probe (IP) test of forgetting (left panel). In contrast, the same-probe (SP)
measure of suppression-induced forgetting, which is likely contaminated by noninhibitory influences, exhibited
no such relationship (right panel). Data were z-normalized within counterbalancing conditions. Ten bivariate
outliers across the two correlations (automatically identified and statistically corrected for by the Robust
Correlation Toolbox; Pernet et al., 2013) were removed from these plots accordingly. Note that positive y-values
represent suppression-induced forgetting in these scatterplots, unlike the column graphs found elsewhere in this
paper, which represent suppression-induced forgetting with negative values.
12 HULBERT AND ANDERSON
suggesting that these variables are unlikely to explain differences
observed in this analysis. Still, we asked whether these factors
possibly could account for the observed relationship between
trauma history and suppression-induced forgetting; partial corre-
lation analyses (two-tailed tests) suggested not. After controlling
for both of these variables, trauma history and IP forgetting re-
mained significantly related, prs(82) 0.25, p .025. In contrast,
there again was no reliable relationship between trauma history
and SP forgetting, prs(82)  0.03, p  .798.
Discussion
The integrated analysis helped confirm several important as-
pects of the case for a trauma-history advantage. First, the com-
bined analysis demonstrated that our participants, who reported
experiencing varying amounts of trauma, did not differ reliably in
other aspects of performance that were unrelated to inhibitory
control, including the ability to benefit from repeated retrieval of
Think items—even when considering a much larger sample of
participants. The groups did, however, consistently differ in the
amount of suppression-induced forgetting they exhibited, a pattern
that was statistically equivalent across the two studies. Second, our
correlational analyses revealed that the relationship between
trauma history and superior forgetting is not tied specifically to our
group analysis approach, as it also emerges when one considers
continuous variation in the level of trauma. The correlational
approach further revealed evidence for the superiority of the IP test
in isolating evidence of improved inhibitory control with higher
trauma—an effect that was suggestive, though statistically weak,
in our group approach. Third, these analyses suggest that differ-
ences in Baseline recall or in depression symptoms across trauma
groups are unlikely to provide an alternative account of our find-
ings. Finally, the combined analysis yielded evidence that even
participants who reported experiencing lower rates of trauma ex-
hibit some forgetting, but that this forgetting is cue-dependent,
which may not reflect inhibition.3 Taken together, these findings
provide strong converging evidence that participants who have
lived through more adverse experiences in their lives show im-
proved ability to contend with unwanted memories, as hypothe-
sized.
General Discussion
Life experience often supplies natural opportunities for refining
skills. Whereas few would argue that traumas are good, they may
nonetheless drive adaptation that promotes resilience. We claim
that controlling one’s memories—remembering what is relevant
and setting aside that which is maladaptive—is a valuable skill
(see Nørby, 2018, for a review). Here we considered the possibility
that trauma experience affords many survivors the opportunity to
adapt their memory control abilities, enabling them to better reg-
ulate intrusive memories. Though honed in response to particular
traumas, these adaptations may generalize to unrelated memories
producing lasting benefits that promote long-term resilience in the
face of adversity (Seery, 2011). Our data, although correlational in
nature, are consistent with this possibility. In our samples, those
reporting more traumatic life events prior to age 18 were better at
suppressing retrieval of novel associations, regardless of the va-
lence of the suppressed content. We observed evidence of this
advantage across two experiments. These individual differences in
suppression success are unlikely to reflect biases in reporting
to-be-suppressed items or experimenter bias in the administration
or scoring of the Think/No-Think task: Offering financial incen-
tives for accurate recall and blinding experimenters/data coders to
participants’ trauma history had no effect on the suppression
advantage. These findings suggest that those participants who had
lived through a greater number of adversities were genuinely better
at forgetting experiences they sought not to think about, at least in
the context of our controlled laboratory task.
Notably, our higher- and lower-trauma groups performed com-
parably in other respects, despite differences in retrieval-
suppression. The two groups differed neither in Baseline recall nor
in the tendency for repeated retrieval to facilitate Think items.
Comparable recall after paired-associates training suggests that our
trauma groups did not differ markedly in their general motivation
to perform our laboratory tasks. Potential motivational differences
warrant special scrutiny when the groups under consideration
might differ on psychiatric variables, such as depression. However,
we found that symptoms of depression were generally low, on
average, and were similar across groups—in itself a remarkable
finding, given the higher-trauma group’s history of adversity.
Importantly, partialing out depression scores did not meaningfully
alter the relationship between trauma exposure and suppression-
induced forgetting. Taken together, these findings are consistent
with trauma experience selectively improving memory inhibition,
rather than affecting overall memory performance or motivation.
Indeed, the enhanced forgetting in the higher-trauma group was
especially evident on a test of cue-independent forgetting designed
to isolate the influence of inhibitory control (Levy & Anderson,
2008; Schilling et al., 2014). In contrast to the higher-trauma
group, forgetting in the lower-trauma group did not generalize
across test types. This cue-dependent pattern observed for the
lower-trauma group suggests that the effect reflects mechanisms
that promoted retrieval interference at the time of test, more than
inhibition of the to-be-suppressed responses.
Interestingly, the current data indicate that the trauma-related
memory advantage did not vary according to the valence of the
target items being suppressed. Benefits arose for both negative and
neutral stimuli. There are reasons to expect that this need not have
been the case. For one, people with a greater history of trauma
might have shown less benefit of their prior experience for nega-
tive material, perhaps because they could have been distracted by
relationships of the materials to their own lives. For another,
greater benefits for negative content might have arisen if suppress-
ing traumatic intrusions had fostered distinctive component pro-
cesses not involved in suppressing neutral content. The absence of
such an advantage in our data could indicate that the cognitive and
neural mechanisms involved in suppressing aversive and neutral
3 An analysis of postexperimental questionnaire questions that probed
participants for the strategy that they used for each individual cue word
(Levy & Anderson, 2008) revealed highly similar frequencies of reported
strategies across the higher- and lower-trauma groups. No differences in
strategy frequency were reliable, and strategy reports were not correlated
with suppression-induced forgetting. One interpretation of this finding is
that, rather than using qualitatively different strategies, the lower-trauma
group simply was less able to engage the hypothesized inhibitory control
process thought to trigger generalized forgetting.
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content are similar, a possibility compatible with imaging work on
retrieval suppression (Gagnepain et al., 2017). Alternatively, dif-
ferential effects for valenced content might have been observed
had we manipulated valence more strongly (e.g., with aversive
pictures) or had we used materials tailored to trauma (as is some-
times done in directed forgetting work—McNally, Ristuccia, &
Perlman, 2005; Moulds & Bryant, 2002; Noreen & MacLeod,
2013; Zoellner, Sacks, & Foa, 2003). The present pattern of results
is, nonetheless, consistent with our theory that trauma history
fosters a generalized retrieval suppression skill not limited to
affective content.
Although both experiments found superior memory inhibition in
participants with a history of adversity, our data may underesti-
mate the true strength of this relationship. Our ability to test this
relationship depended on how accurately we could quantify par-
ticipants’ trauma history. Should individuals with more traumas be
better at forgetting, as predicted, this superior memory control
ability may actually cause them to underestimate the true fre-
quency of their own adverse experiences. In some cases, this
underestimation even might have led them to be misclassified into
our lower-trauma group. The impact of this dynamic should de-
pend on the nature of the forgetting induced by retrieval suppres-
sion. On the one hand, if suppression primarily reduces involun-
tary retrievals of unwanted memories or degrades the specificity of
episodic details of those events without affecting voluntary access
to them (e.g., Noreen & MacLeod, 2013; Stephens, Braid, &
Hertel, 2013), suppression may not alter people’s estimates of their
own trauma frequency very much. On the other hand, if suppres-
sion induces more generalized memory loss for the unwanted
events, frequency estimates may be more distorted, reducing dif-
ferences in forgetting across lower- and higher-trauma groups,
increasing the likelihood of potential misclassifications, and re-
ducing correlations between forgetting and trauma history. Al-
though we cannot discern the influence of such an effect in our
dataset, this putative bias works against our hypothesis. That we
nevertheless observed a robust relationship between trauma history
and suppression-induced forgetting is, therefore, all the more re-
markable.
Relation to Existing Work
Two features of the current work make it unique in its capacity
to shed light on how cumulative lifetime adversity might affect the
ability to control intrusive memories. First, prior studies that
examined the relationship of trauma to memory inhibition used
variants of the retrieval-induced forgetting or directed forgetting
paradigms (Amir, Badour, & Freese, 2009; McNally et al., 2005;
Moulds & Bryant, 2002; Zoellner et al., 2003). The relevance of
the behavioral circumstances posed by these two procedures to
controlling intrusive memories is arguably indirect: Retrieval-
induced forgetting concerns the tendency for retrieval of some
items to incidentally inhibit other competing memories; directed
forgetting concerns the ability to forget an immediately preceding
event or set of events, in some cases by terminating encoding of
the event. Although both tasks can involve inhibitory control,
neither addresses the situation most relevant to combating intru-
sive memories of trauma: confronting unwelcome reminders and
needing to suppress episodic retrieval to prevent awareness of an
intrusive memory. We argue that studying retrieval suppression as
we do here more directly speaks to the mechanisms relevant to
understanding how people regulate intrusions of experiences that
are well encoded (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Second, little
work with the directed forgetting procedure has quantified lifetime
history of adversity; rather, most such studies have instead focused
on diagnostic groups with documented evidence of a disorder (e.g.,
PTSD or acute stress disorder; e.g., McNally et al., 2005; Moulds
& Bryant, 2002; Zoellner et al., 2003). Although findings have
been variable, patients with PTSD often show impaired directed
forgetting (see, e.g., McNally, 1998), paralleling studies of re-
trieval suppression in PTSD (Catarino et al., 2015). However, by
focusing on a more diverse sample of participants, rather than
preselecting on the basis of clinical disorders, we argue that the
current study, with its relatively comprehensive accounting of
lifetime traumatic experience, is better positioned to characterize
the general association between adversity and memory inhibition.
As such, this study adds to a growing body of work indicating
that suppression-induced forgetting, as measured by the Think/No-
Think paradigm, reflects mechanisms engaged in everyday control
over unwanted memories that appear relevant to resilience in the
face of unpleasant experiences. For instance, superior self-reported
ability to control everyday thoughts not only predicts lower levels
of anxiety, depression, and obsessional thinking, but also better
suppression-induced forgetting in the laboratory (Küpper, Benoit,
Dalgleish, & Anderson, 2014). Other work has revealed negative
relationships between suppression-induced forgetting and rumina-
tion (Fawcett et al., 2015; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003), trait anxiety
(Dieler, Plichta, Dresler, & Fallgatter, 2010; Marzi, Regina, &
Righi, 2014), and PTSD symptoms (Catarino et al., 2015). Impor-
tantly, individuals who demonstrated superior suppression-
induced forgetting in a simple verbal Think/No-Think task were
found to experience fewer distressing memory intrusions in the
week following exposure to a traumatic film (Streb, Mecklinger,
Anderson, Lass-Hennemann, & Michael, 2016). This finding sug-
gests that laboratory measures of retrieval suppression ability are
linked to resilience in the face of stressful events. Together with
this literature, our current findings suggest that memory control
processes engaged during retrieval suppression may play an im-
portant role in the adaptation that typically occurs after a trauma
and to the building of future resilience. Nevertheless, it would be
desirable in future work to directly establish, within the same
study, the link between exposure to trauma, superior memory
control, and resilience in the face of novel stressors (cf. Seery, Leo,
Lupien, Kondrak, & Almonte, 2013).
The current findings cannot distinguish whether traumatic ex-
periences improved participants’ memory control or, conversely,
whether good preexisting memory control abilities enabled our
higher-trauma participants to overcome their challenging history
and make it to college and into our sample. Moreover, without
detailed information regarding the severity or developmental tim-
ing of the traumas reported by our sample—or whether any led to
PTSD or other mental health conditions—we are currently unable
to address the extent to which these factors relate to memory
suppression abilities and overall resilience. These questions merit
careful scrutiny in future work. However, structural adaptations in
the right DLPFC in the year following trauma and their relation-
ship to recovery from PTSD (Lyoo et al., 2011) suggest that, at
least in adults, retrieval suppression abilities may well undergo
adaptation in many individuals, given the right DLPFC’s involve-
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ment in this control ability (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Anal-
ogous experience-dependent changes in task-relevant brain struc-
tures have been found after practice at golf (Bezzola, Mérillat,
Gaser, & Jäncke, 2011), musical performance (Herholz & Zatorre,
2012), left-handed writing and drawing (Wenger et al., 2017), and
even working memory (Metzler-Baddeley, Caeyenberghs, Foley,
& Jones, 2016) and inhibitory control (Chavan, Mouthon, Dragan-
ski, van der Zwaag, & Spierer, 2015)—with these changes pre-
dicting behavioral performance (Draganski et al., 2014; May,
2011). To substantiate the hypothesized role of cortical plasticity
in improving retrieval suppression, future work should track mem-
ory control ability longitudinally in participants who have recently
experienced trauma. Doing so could help determine whether be-
havioral and structural adaptations arising from the trauma predict
recovery from intrusion symptoms. If trauma can naturally im-
prove retrieval suppression, as the Lyoo et al. (2011) and current
data suggest, it would broaden our understanding of the conse-
quences that trauma has on mental function. Such effects of trauma
on memory control are consistent with the broad proposal that
psychiatric conditions promote generalized habits of thought (Her-
tel, 2004).
Given the aforementioned considerations, the current evidence
for trauma-related advantages in memory control provides a cred-
ible account regarding the cognitive mechanisms that underlie
reports of positive effects of adversity on resilience. Seery et al.
(2010) noted that, although adversity may have a negative effect
on current and future mental health and well-being (e.g., Brewin,
Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Edwards, Holden, Felitti, & Anda,
2003; Golding, 1999), having experienced a moderate level of
adversity may be beneficial in developing mechanisms that im-
prove future resilience. In a large scale (N  2000) longitudinal
study, they found a nonmonotonic relationship between cumula-
tive lifetime history of adversity and measures of mental health:
Moderate adversity was associated with higher self-reported men-
tal health (i.e., lower reported depression/anxiety, lower global
distress, lower functional impairment, lower posttraumatic stress)
and well-being (i.e., higher rated life satisfaction) compared with
having experienced high adversity or no adversity at all. Higher
cumulative adversity predicted greater resilience when encounter-
ing new traumas years later. Strikingly, the benefits of moderate
adversity also arise in laboratory measures of people’s stress
responses, including: (a) lower ratings of pain intensity during a
cold-pressor task and reduced situational catastrophizing (persis-
tent negative thoughts), and (b) reduced online cardiovascular
measures of challenge/threat in response to a stressful intelligence
test (Seery et al., 2013). Given evidence supporting a common
inhibitory control mechanism mediated by the right prefrontal
cortex underlying the suppression of unwanted thoughts, emotions,
and actions (Depue, Orr, Smolker, Naaz, & Banich, 2016; Gagne-
pain et al., 2017; Guo, Schmitz, Mur, Ferreira, & Anderson, 2018;
Schmitz, Correia, Ferreira, Prescot, & Anderson, 2017), we sug-
gest that both the data on resilience and the current findings are
compatible with the possibility that adversity trains a general
inhibitory control mechanism. Although this inhibition plasticity
hypothesis is plausible, matters are complex, given trauma’s par-
allel detrimental impacts on well-being. For example, it is unclear
why individuals with much higher lifetime adversity show poorer
outcomes (Seery et al., 2010) under this account. One possibility is
that high, repeated stress could have toxic effects that compromise
the neural mechanisms that implement inhibitory control (e.g.,
GABAergic inhibition in the hippocampus; Schmitz et al., 2017).
It remains possible that we, too, would have observed a nonmono-
tonic relationship between prior adversity and memory suppres-
sion had we captured in our sample a wider range of trauma
frequency or severity.
Implications
If the inhibition plasticity hypothesis is correct and real-world
conditions precipitate cortical plasticity that supports new habits of
thought, this gives hope to potential interventions designed to train
memory control, complementing standard cognitive–behavioral
therapy. Currently, it is widely believed that avoiding distressing
memories exacerbates PTSD symptoms by keeping suppressed
memories accessible (e.g., Dalgleish, Hauer, & Kuyken, 2008).
Cognitive–behavioral therapy for PTSD is considered effective
because it encourages patients to stop avoiding memories and to
confront reminders until the traumatic memories become less distress-
ing (Kar, 2011). We suggest an alternative possibility, proposing that
there is an important distinction between avoiding reminders, on the
one hand, and avoiding the memory (via suppression) after a reminder
is confronted, on the other. The former strategy is expected to pre-
serve memories by depriving people of opportunities to forget via
inhibitory control, whereas avoidance by successful retrieval suppres-
sion is beneficial. Thus, like cognitive–behavioral therapy, retrieval
suppression forces people to confront reminders, but has the potential
to allow many of these individuals to learn to control awareness of
their memories. Given this perspective, training in retrieval suppres-
sion may augment the benefits of cognitive–behavioral therapy by
enabling patients to confront reminders and redirect to more benign
thoughts.
Suggesting that forgetting unwanted memories may be helpful
might seem in conflict with the fact that memory lapses for
significant aspects of a trauma are considered a hallmark symptom
of PTSD, according to the current edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5; American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2013). If so, forgetting is arguably an un-
healthy outcome rather than a healthy goal. Two points are worth
emphasizing, however. First, as noted previously, research on
retrieval-suppression (Catarino et al., 2015), directed forgetting
(e.g., McNally, 1998), and even motor response inhibition (Fal-
coner et al., 2008) point to a general deficit in inhibitory control
that compromises the effective suppression of intrusive memories
in PTSD. If so, then any memory lapses (often referred to as
memory fragmentation; see, e.g., Brewin, 2007, 2014) that occur
in PTSD may not arise from suppression, but rather from some
other process. One possible origin may be compromised episodic
encoding of trauma attributable to the impact of extreme stress on
hippocampal function in response to the traumatic event (Brewin,
Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). If stress impairs encoding,
then the loss of episodic memory may not itself be a direct cause
of PTSD symptoms, but rather an indirect reflection (or marker) of
the severity of the original stress response. Second, despite support
from a number of studies (see, e.g., Brewin, 2007, 2014, for
reviews), the existence of elevated fragmentation/incoherence of
trauma memories in PTSD has been challenged (Rubin et al.,
2016; but see Brewin, 2016), raising the possibility that memory
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lapses might not be as reliable a symptom of PTSD as previously
thought. Given these observations, we see value in entertaining the
possibility that forgetting arising from the successful down-
regulation of intrusive memories via retrieval suppression may be
a healthy coping response that is dysfunctional in PTSD, leading to
difficulty controlling intrusive memories.
Even if retrieval suppression may be healthy by helping to
reduce intrusive memories, recent evidence suggests that this ben-
efit also comes with other costs during the adjustment process. As
people recover from trauma, they often exhibit generalized mem-
ory deficits—including overgeneral autobiographical memory and
episodic memory impairments (e.g., Brewin, 2011; Ono, Devilly,
& Shum, 2016). Evidence indicates that some forms of retrieval
suppression may contribute to these side effects (Dalgleish et al.,
2008; Hulbert et al., 2016). For example, when people suppress
retrieval, it not only impairs memory for the suppressed trace, but
also induces an amnesic shadow over events occurring before and
after suppression (Hulbert et al., 2016; Hulbert, Hirschstein,
Brontë, & Broughton, 2018). This diffuse memory deficit likely
arises from the down-regulation of hippocampal activity caused by
retrieval suppression (Anderson et al., 2004) and the resulting
disturbance it creates in hippocampal processes like establishing
stable, contextualized memories. Such deficits should be greatest
in those victims of trauma with intact retrieval suppression ability.
Though clearly not desirable, this temporary decline in memory
function may represent a trade-off between the need to regulate
intrusive memories that disrupt life on one hand, and general
mnemonic functioning on the other. Once intrusive memories have
been regulated and control processes refined, memory may im-
prove. Indeed, these types of memory deficits following trauma
often abate as intrusions decline (Guez et al., 2013).
Exposure to trauma, unfortunately, is pervasive. Data from the
World Mental Health Survey Consortium indicate that more than
70% of the nearly 70,000 adults responding from 24 countries
across the globe have been exposed to at least one traumatic event
in their lifetimes; more than 30% have been exposed to four or
more such events (Benjet et al., 2016). Benjet and colleagues went
on to report that the overall prevalence of exposure in the United
States topped 82% in the years surveyed. Within the U.S. college
population from which our participants were drawn, published
prevalence estimates range considerably (up to 84%), reflecting
variable thresholds in classifying potentially traumatic events
(Read, Ouimette, White, Colder, & Farrow, 2011). On the low end,
a full 66% of the 3,014 incoming college students assessed across
two midsized public universities reported exposure that met a strict
criterion based on the DSM (Read et al., 2011). The students
reported a mean of 1.5 traumatic events leading up to college
matriculation, with a quarter of the overall sample reporting three
or more events and 9% meeting criteria for PTSD.
In light of these numbers, it is perhaps not so surprising (albeit
quite regrettable) that many of our participants were reportedly
exposed to multiple traumas over the first 18 years of their lives.
To compare with previous research using the BBTS, we summed
the number of items on the traumatic experiences survey for which
individuals reported at least one traumatic episode (e.g., Freyd,
Klest, & Allard, 2005). This yielded an average of 2.00 (SD 
2.16) endorsed items across our entire sample (i.e., irrespective of
both experiment and group classification). Broadly, this average is
in line with other work using the BBTS. For example, Platt and
Freyd (2015) reported that their sample of 124 undergraduates
experienced 3.73 total traumas on average before the age of
18—the slightly higher value possibly reflecting that their sample
was restricted to females, given the gendered nature of betrayal
trauma (DePrince & Freyd, 2002).
It is important to note that we did not have the resources to
verify the traumas reported by our participants. As noted previ-
ously, however, the incidence rates may, nevertheless, reflect an
underestimate of trauma, especially for individuals better able to
prevent unwanted memories from surfacing. Some of the reported
traumas may reflect the fallout from singular events (e.g., a major
hurricane resulting in significant loss), whereas others may reflect
repeated episodes of mistreatment (e.g., emotional, physical, or
sexual). Our investigation did not seek to assess the relative
severity of these episodes. Instead, we aimed to capture an inclu-
sive estimate of the number of events considered by participants to
have been traumatic and relate it to suppression-induced forgetting
in the laboratory. Indeed, if our hypothesis is correct and painful
real-life experiences yield natural opportunities to practice a gen-
eralizable skill for controlling memories, the cumulative volume of
these adverse experiences may matter more to the relationship than
whether the experiences meet the same objective criteria across
individuals. Lacking objective and subjective measures of the
severity of verified traumatic experiences, we are unable to speak
directly to this possibility at present.
Concluding Remarks
Although approximately 7% to 8% of people develop persistent
PTSD in the wake of trauma, most people recover (Kessler et al.,
2005). Our findings suggest that traumatic experiences—as horri-
ble as they may be—might naturally contribute to the adaptation of
cognitive control skills, thereby improving many survivors’ later
resilience, at least those who experienced only moderate levels of
trauma. We submit the novel hypothesis that the positive role of
suppression in the remission of intrusive memories and its broader
benefit to resilience may have been missed in prior work estab-
lishing thought suppression as a predictor of PTSD maintenance
(e.g., Ehlers et al., 1998). Suppression may indeed increase intru-
sions and the duration of PTSD in a subsample of trauma survivors
with general deficits in inhibitory control (Bomyea & Lang, 2016;
Catarino et al., 2015; Falconer et al., 2008), and this may contrib-
ute to such an association, together with other maintaining factors.
Chronic PTSD sufferers may also be less able to adapt control
mechanisms over time, perhaps in part because of genetic variation
in cortical plasticity (see Lyoo et al., 2011). But the present work
suggests that, for many victims living with trauma, there may be
hope in the adage that whatever doesn’t kill you makes you
stronger.
Context of the Research
Clinicians and clinical researchers commonly believe that sup-
pressing unwanted thoughts and memories is a maladaptive coping
response to trauma that predicts worse mental health outcomes.
We argue that this view overlooks the potential adaptive benefits
of suppression in promoting current well-being and in shaping the
future capacity for resilience. Whereas it is true that 7% to 8% of
people develop persistent PTSD in the wake of trauma, most
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people recover (Kessler et al., 2005). Given the challenge that
recovering from trauma poses, this process seems likely to shape
cognitive and emotional processes. Our findings suggest that over-
coming such adversity contributes to the adaptation of cognitive
control skills, at least in those who experienced only moderate
levels of trauma—potentially improving their later resilience. This
proposed positive role of suppression in the remission of intrusive
memories may have been missed in prior work establishing
thought suppression as a predictor of PTSD maintenance (e.g.,
Ehlers et al., 1998). Suppression may indeed increase intrusions
and the duration of PTSD in a subsample of trauma survivors with
deficits in inhibitory control (Bomyea & Lang, 2016; Catarino et
al., 2015; Falconer et al., 2008), and this may contribute to such an
association. Chronic PTSD sufferers may also be less able to adapt
control mechanisms over time, perhaps in part because of genetic
variation in cortical plasticity (see Lyoo et al., 2011). But for many
victims living with trauma, efforts to achieve emotional balance by
down-regulating intrusive thoughts may act as a natural form of
cognitive training.
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